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Thomas Nagel's essayl provides a clear, thoughtful, and useful anal-
ysis of some of the values at stake in political, legal, and academic
debates over inheritance taxation. In this Commentary, I want to fo-
cus on just one of the normative commitments that Nagel identifies,
quite correctly, as at stake in U.S. discussions of estate tax reform.
Nagel suggests that "the right to devote one's resources to one's
family" is "a right whose exercise is seen as a virtue," and he considers
it to be "the most significant legitimate value in support of limits on
the taxation of inheritance."2 Nagel also suggests that a high exemp-
tion level could help implement the value of "helping people" while
also preserving taxation of inheritances above that level.3
This Commentary begins to examine what it might mean for the law
to protect a "right to use one's resources to benefit one's family." The
inquiry requires a theory of the family, of course: Without some no-
tion of what the family ought to be or ought to do, it is impossible to
say what the right to benefit one's family entails. My method here is
to look to historical debates over inheritance law to draw out three
rather different ideals of the family that have recurred over time.
The analysis here suggests that, while Nagel is quite right that one
can interpret values associated with family life in such a way as to
oppose the inheritance tax, there are equally plausible interpretations
of these values according to which the family can co-exist peaceably
with the taxation of inheritance, at least in some form. And this basic
point holds whether one conceives of the family in liberal terms, in
conventional terms, or in functional terms. Put another way, any of
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the three ideals of the family is compatible with a range of positions
on the relationship of the family to the state. But although each vision
of the family might co-exist with inheritance taxation, the three ideals
do have markedly different implications for the terms of inheritance
law and inheritance taxation.
II. INHERITANCE TAXATION, INHERITANCE LAW, AND THE FAMILY
Inheritance taxation is obviously a tax matter, and as such it raises
familiar issues about the relationship of the individual and his prop-
erty to the state. At the same time, inheritance taxation also forms
part of inheritance law-the body of law that regulates the transmission
of property by gift during life and by bequest during death. And in-
heritance law is intimately bound up with ideals about the family: The
family is, after all, one of the key institutions for transmitting assets,
knowledge, and values across generations, and in the broadest sense
the family itself forms part of the structures of inheritance that deter-
mine what children receive from their elders.
Thus, it is not surprising that values associated with family life have
been front and center in debates over the federal estate tax in the
United States in recent years. As Michael Graetz and Ian Shapiro
recount, opponents of the so-called "death tax" have claimed that the
tax harms families, particularly families that own farms and small busi-
nesses.4 Graetz and Shapiro track the importance of family stories in
the lobbying and legislative processes that gradually accumulated the
votes needed to repeal (if only for the year 2010) the federal estate
tax,S and I return to one such story a bit later on.6
The present debate over the estate tax continues a long tradition of
linking ideals of family life to inheritance law. In an important new
book, Jens Beckert traces debates over inheritance law and inheri-
tance taxation occurring in the United States, France, and Germany
over the last 300 years.? Beckert discusses testamentary freedom, re-
served shares, intestacy, and entails, as well as inheritance taxation.8
Each of these controversies also involved claims not particularly re-
lated to the family: For instance, people have long debated the eco-
nomic effects of different inheritance rules. But Beckert also finds
4 Michael J. Graetz & Ian Shapiro, Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Fight over Taxing
Inherited Wealth 50-51 (2005).
5 Id. at 50, 231-32.
6 See Part III.
7 Jens Beckert, Inherited Wealth (Thomas Dunlap trans., Princeton Univ. Press
2008)(2004).
8 Id. at 10-12.
Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Tax Law Review
2009] COMMENTARY 125
that claims about family life played a significant role and that ideals of
family varied across countries and across time.9
Any analysis of the relationship between the family and inheritance
taxation requires some theory of the family. That is, before we can
consider whether or not family values stand in tension with inheri-
tance taxation, we have to know the values the family is supposed to
serve. In building such a theory, one might look to different academic
disciplines. We could start with anthropology and ask how our society
understands kinship in order to infer some ideal of the family. Alter-
natively, we could begin with sociology and consult the rapidly chang-
ing demographics of the U.S. family in order to ask whether there are
constellations of family values that endure across demographic groups
and amidst change.
In this Commentary, however, I take a different approach. Draw-
ing on Beckert's comparative study, I identify three ideals of the fam-
ily that have recurred in Western debates over inheritance law in the
past three centuries. To make the analysis tractable, I term these "the
liberal family," "the conventional family," and "the functional fam-
ily."l0 The liberal family reflects ideals of individual freedom, the
conventional family incorporates traditions of family obligation, and
the functional family reflects the family's social role as a source of
economic security for its members.
Thus, a preliminary point, which I think emerges beautifully from
Beckert's work, is that inheritance law does not reflect a simple or
unitary ideal of the family. Instead, there are multiple conceptions of
the family that sometimes have conflicting implications, even though
each might support a generic claim that one has a "right to use one's
resources to benefit one's family."
My principal thesis in this Commentary is that none of the three
ideals necessarily stands in opposition to inheritance taxation. Nagel
is quite right that one can interpret values associated with family life
in such a way as to oppose the inheritance tax. But there are equally
plausible interpretations of these common ideals of family that can co-
exist peaceably with the taxation of inheritance. In each case, a strong
anti-inheritance tax argument requires grafting a particular normative
position onto the relationship between the family and the state, a posi-
tion that holds (1) that the family alone must serve its values or its
functions and (2) that any taxation represents an inappropriate inter-
ference by the collective with the exercise of those values or functions.
9 Id. at 110-13.
10 Beckert does not use these names or these three categories, which I adopt simply to
organize the analysis. Throughout the Commentary, however, I cite to Beckert for exam-
ples of how these conceptions of the family have appeared in debates over inheritance law.
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Still, the three ideals of the family do have distinctive implications
for the terms of inheritance law and the specific legal details of inheri-
tance taxation. Institutional design questions including spousal ex-
emptions, favorable rates for bequests to close kin, and valuation and
timing rules might look very different depending on which conception
of the family one adopts.
One clarification before I move on. Throughout this Commentary,
I use the terms "inheritance tax" and "estate tax" to refer generically
to the taxation of wealth transfers. I realize that there are importance
differences among types of wealth transfer taxes,l1 but my question
here is whether family values should lead one to oppose (or favor) any
variant of such taxes, and so I abstract from the institutional differ-
ences among types of taxes.
III. A FAMILY STORY
To make the following discussion a bit more concrete, begin with
one of the family stories offered by opponents of the estate tax.12 Tes-
timony delivered by Mr. K. L. Bliss to a congressional committee in
2001 sounds many of the common themes found in these stories: hard
work by members of several generations, a modest income and life-
style, and a very specific, local context, in this case cattle ranching in
Montana.
My grandfather came to Montana in the late 1800's and
homesteaded near Broadus, Montana. He passed away in
the 1940's and my grandmother eventually sold that ranch to
help my parents purchase the ranch that my wife, Cheryle,
and I operate, along with my son, Matt, and his family today.
My family has operated this ranch since 1955, and I am
proud to be a third generation Montana rancher. ...
I started working this ranch at six years old driving a trac-
tor in the hay field. TIle assets I received from my parents
were not a windfall. I operated the ranch for 25 years before
they died, and took a great deal of financial risk that almost
cost us the ranch in the early 1980's. I started in 1973 with an
old house and a couple of old wooden sheds and with years
of hard work and good management, our ranch today is one
11 See Anne L. Alstott, Equal Opportunity and Inheritance Taxation, 121 Harv. L. Rev.
469, 502 tbI.1 (2007).
12 For additional stories, see William W. Beach, Heritage Found., Death Tax Devasta-
tion: Horror Stories from Middle-Class America (1995). Graetz and Shapiro discuss some
of Beach's stories. Graetz & Shapiro, note 4, at 50-51, 57, 63, 65.
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of the most productive and improved ranches in the county.
Hard work should be rewarded, not penalized by a death tax.
Our ranch is more than just a business or a home; it is a
lifetime commitment by past, present and future generations.
We have worked hard all our life on this ranch, and at some
point we'd like to be able to do more than buy fence posts
and insurance policies. This is my reality, but could become
my son's nightmare if the death tax is not eliminated.
Some would have you believe that only the richest 1 or 2%
ever pay death taxes. My wife sure doesn't feel rich; she still
has the same old carpet that was put in the house in 1976.13
I assume that Mr. Bliss' story is true (although, as Graetz and Sha-
piro point out, some elements of some stories offered by the anti-
death-tax forces are not).l4 But the literal truth of this particular story
is not critical to my analysis. Instead, I want to suggest that this famil-
iar kind of story actually contains the seeds of three different norma-
tive views of the nature and social function of the family.
A. The Liberal Family
The family sometimes appears in V.S. law and in liberal theory as a
sphere for the exercise of individual freedom. Call this the liberal
family. I do not mean, of course, "liberal" as in right-left politics. In-
stead, I use the term liberal to invoke the strand of political theory
that gives pride of place to individual liberty as a defining value.
There are many strands of liberalism, and in a moment I insist on
some demarcations. But I want to begin with a big and somewhat
underspecified category called "liberalism" because the liberal family
is deeply ingrained in V.S. law and culture, and I suspect many people
have something like the liberal family in mind when they suppose that
the family stands in opposition to inheritance taxation.
The liberal family, in the V.S. tradition, treats the family as a pri-
vate sphere, a place where consenting adults come together to define
mutually agreeable relationships and a shared way of life. The liberal
principle of state neutrality suggests that the law should take a hands-
off attitude when it comes to the family. The family, by and large,
should be immune from legal attempts to prescribe emotional or fi-
13 Preserving and Protecting Family Business Legacies: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Taxation and IRS Oversight of the Sen. Finance Comm., 107th Congo 2, 5 (2001) (state-
ment of K.L. Bliss, National Cattlemen's Beef Association), available at http://fi-
nance.senate.gov/031501kbtest.pdf.
14 Graetz & Shapiro, note 4, at 65-66 (discussing the story of Chester Thigpen, whose
estate was likely too small to be taxable under the existing estate tax).
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nancial relationships among individuals. Within wide boundaries, the
law should permit people to consort with those they wish; they should
determine for themselves the content and expectations attending their
relationships, including the terms for entry and exit into the
relationship.
This is not to say that there are no liberal rationales for legal inter-
vention in family life. Familiar principles would permit, even require,
legal measures to protect people from coercion and violence. But un-
less relatively severe harm is at stake, the traditional version of the
liberal family grants wide scope for individual freedom and privacy
and only a narrow role for legal regulation of family life.15
The ideal of the liberal family undergirds U.S. inheritance law, in-
cluding the core principle of testator freedom, and it recurs through-
out U.S. family law as well.l6 As Beckert's survey points out, the
value of testamentary freedom has been especially strong and uncon-
tested in the United States since its founding. In contrast to France
and to Germany, which debated repeatedly the appropriate degree to
which the law ought to defer to testators' wishes, the United States
has a solid tradition of testamentary freedom, grounded in an ideal of
individual liberty.17
Many people may have something like the liberal family in mind
when they think that the right to leave one's property to one's family
stands opposed to the taxation of inheritance. If family life is properly
a sphere for individual freedom and state nonintervention, then it may
seem to follow that the individual ought to be free to leave his prop-
erty to those he chooses and that the state should not regulate,
whether by taxation or otherwise, the inheritance arrangements that
individuals construct for themselves. It would seem, then, that the
nontaxation of inheritance is a simple extension of testator freedom:
The state should not use its coercive power to require individuals to
leave any part of their wealth to anyone in particular, including the
state.
But this simple intuition is too simple. A closer look suggests that a
commitment to testator freedom does not necessarily require opposi-
tion to the taxation of inheritance. We can certainly get there if we
lump the state together with all other heirs not chosen by the testator.
By making that move, we treat the state's exercise of its taxing power
as an illegitimate legal requirement that the testator leave a portion of
her wealth to the state.
15 At least, this is one familiar liberal view. For a different view, at least with respect to
families involved in child-rearing, see Anne L. Alstott, Is the Family at Odds with Equal-
ity? The Legal Implications of Equality for Children, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2 (2008).
16 Id. at 5.
J7 Beckert, note 7, at 80-81.
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But the proposition that the state is just an unchosen beneficiary
(and therefore illegitimate) is a radical and contested claim-and it is,
of course, one of the critical premises that separates libertarianism
from egalitarian forms of liberalism. On the libertarian view, the state
has no legitimate power to take private property via taxation, except
for very limited uses. By contrast, egalitarian views endow the state
with greater powers to structure the conditions in which individuals
properly exercise their freedom. An egalitarian might argue, just to
take one example, that measures to equalize the distribution of inher-
ited wealth take priority over testator freedom-in other words, that
laws regulating inheritance help to define the sphere in which family
privacy properly may and may not operate.
Many theorists have developed the implications of egalitarian liber-
alism for inheritance taxation,18 and Nagel's article lays out a variety
of values at stake.I9 My point is simply that the ideal of the liberal
family, standing alone, cannot answer the question whether society
should-or should not-adopt an inheritance tax. The liberal family
leads to the antitax result only if we graft on the libertarian principle
identified as Nagel's value number seven: the view that the testator
alone should have the power to determine her heirs, and that there-
fore the state is an illegitimate (because unchosen) heir.20
Still, the core values associated with the liberal family do have
strong implications for the design of inheritance law and inheritance
taxation. The principle of state neutrality, for instance, suggests that
the law should neither require nor reward inheritances given to cer-
tain individuals rather than to others. On the liberal view, the individ-
ual is king, and she may legitimately choose to leave her wealth to her
children, to a home for poodles, or to the Boston Red Sox. The core
values here are freedom, individualism, and self-determination rather
than obligation (unless the testator has bound himself by contract in
some way).
B. The Conventional Family
By contrast, the second ideal of the family centers on obligation and
responsibility, and it tends to endorse legal measures that constrain
the individual to attend to her socially determined duties. Call this
second ideal the conventional family, because it draws on certain con-
ventions or social norms that treat the family as if it exists and endures
as a social unit apart from the individual.
18 See, e.g., Alstott, note 11, at 471-72, 475.
19 Nagel, note 1, at 114.
20 Id.
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On this view, the family is defined, not by individual choice, but by
a web of obligations that bind the members of the family together. In
legal discourse, the conventional family ideal has found expression in
inheritance law through the value that Beckert terms "family prop-
erty," which treats family assets as if they belong to the family rather
than to the individual owner.21
While the conventional family and family property may at first
sound less familiar to American ears than the liberal family and the
value of testator freedom, something like family property is, I think, at
work in typical claims made in debates over the estate tax. For in-
stance, many stories. offered by "death tax" opponents emphasize the
hard work contributed by several generations to specific prop-
erty-often, a ranch or a business-that the family views as a collective
asset.
In the testimony quoted above, for instance, Mr. Bliss speaks of his
family's ranch as a "lifetime commitment by past, present and future
generations" and notes that "[w]e have worked hard all our life on
this ranch. "22 This account suggests that neither Mr. Bliss nor any
other individual in his family would feel free to dispose of the ranch,
even though the law might technically permit the owner of record to
do so. Instead, there is a sense of communal ownership and mutual
obligation, as each generation contributes labor and makes sacrifices
and, in return, shares in the family's property.
Beckert's historical survey returns several times to the ideal of fam-
ily property, which takes varying forms across countries and centuries.
A version of family property was invoked to defend aristocratic sys-
tems of inheritance, for example.23 The ideal of family property also
has been influential in debates over testamentary freedom, particu-
larly in Germany and in France.24 In Beckert's account, family prop-
erty has been less often asserted in the U.S. context,2s although I
suspect that his methodology may lead him to underplay the extent to
which family values have now entered the U.S. debate over the estate
tax.
Does the conventional family ideal in fact counsel against inheri-
tance taxation? Initially, it is difficult to answer that question because
the conventional family might actually reflect a variety of underlying
21 Beckert, note 7, at 8.
22 Bliss Testimony, note 13, at 5.
23 Beckert, note 7, at 147 (noting that some commentators defended entailed property
as a mechanism for ensuring the continuity of the family and its property over time).
24 See, e.g., id. at 54-56 (family property in nineteenth century German debates over
testamentary freedom); id. at 37-39 (legal mandates for equal distribution to state-identi-
fied heirs in eighteenth century France).
25 Id. at 70, 78.
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ideals about individuals, relationships, and the state. For example,
suppose that we think the conventional family is important because
grouping people into intergenerational social units tends to preserve
social order. Perhaps marriage helps regularize adult life; parents
serve as a useful source of discipline for adult children, and so on. In
that case, the question would be whether inheritance taxation would
undermine social order, and one would need a deeper discussion. In-
deed, the scope of testamentary freedom has been debated in just
such terms: Nineteenth century French scholars debated whether
granting strong control over property to the older generation would
(properly) cement patriarchal control or would (improperly) exclude
too many heirs from the security provided by family property.26
To be sure, we could shortcut such discussions by grafting on a liber-
tarian premise to the conventional family ideal. One could take the
view that, whatever the reasons for keeping property within the fam-
ily, the state is always an outsider and has no proper claim on any
family assets. But if one takes that route, then the value doing the
work is not family property: It is the claim that only family members,
and never the state, can properly partake of family assets. Without
that libertarian premise, it could be entirely compatible with the ideal
of family property for the state to take its share in inheritance taxa-
tion, as long as the residue stays within the family. The point is that
the ideal of family property really only hints at family members' obli-
gations to one another: It does not, without some deeper rationale or
additional premises about the state, tell us much about the proper
scope of the state's taxing power.
But even though the conventional family ideal, at least in this
broad-brush form, is indeterminate on the question of whether the
state ought to tax inheritance, it does have implications for the terms
of inheritance law and taxation. Unlike the liberal family, which privi-
leges testator freedom, the ideal of family property suggests that the
law should not be indifferent to whether the testator chooses the Red
Sox over her children. The notion of family property in effect treats
other family members as having claims that properly limit the free-
dom of the testator.
Thus, the conventional family ideal tends to imply that the law
should require or encourage testators to leave their wealth within the
family. The law, for example, might mandate that parents leave their
wealth to their children. Less coercively, the law might reserve a min-
imum share for the children. Less coercively still, the state might craft
an inheritance tax so that it rewards gifts and bequests within the fam-
ily. The U.S. federal estate tax arguably does something like this by
26 Id. at 41-46.
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giving an unlimited spousal exemption27 (although there are other ra-
tionales for that provision, including the difficulties of assigning own-
ership interests to spouses). Other countries have adopted something
like a family property approach by adopting lower rates of inheritance
tax on intra-family inheritance, especially by children.28
At this point, we have begun to run up against the limitations of the
method adopted in this Commentary, which is to use some rather gen-
eral ideals of family, drawn from inheritance law, as the lens through
which to analyze inheritance taxation. The problem with this method
is that the law offers only very general categories, which tend toward
indeterminacy. Put another way, if one were to take seriously the con-
ventional family as an ideal, one would have to do much more theo-
retical work to determine, for example, what constitutes a family and
which family relationships are to take priority over others.29
The liberal family avoids these questions by saying that a family is
simply an arrangement produced by free choice. But because the con-
ventional family demands strong legal protections for some relation-
ships and not others, it also requires a normative ideal of who is
included, and who is excluded, in drawing the family circle. In the
United States and Europe over time, as Beckert shows, the law has
come to privilege the nuclear family rather than the extended family,
has extended important rights to spouses, including women, and has
come to treat all children equally rather than favoring the oldest
sons.30 This trend might reflect a liberalizing approach, as the law at-
tempts to capture the actual arrangements chosen by people. Or it
might reflect some changing notion of what the conventional family
ought to be.
I will not attempt to specify or to defend a robust notion of the
conventional family here, but it is worth speculating on one possible
extension of the conventional family, since it has implications for one
of the most contentious issues in debates over inheritance taxation-
whether or not the law ought to extend special protections to particu-
lar types of family property, notably family farms and businesses.
The impact of the federal estate tax on family farms and businesses
has been vigorously debated, with much attention given to the empiri-
cal question: How many farms and businesses are sold or shut down
27 IRC § 2056(a).
28 See, e.g., Beckert, note 7, at 261, 270 (discussing French tax rates applied to inheri-
tance by children, spouses, and siblings and comparing German rules).
29 This is a familiar problem in family law. See, e.g., Matthew M. Kavanagh, Rewriting
the Legal Family: Beyond Exclusivity to a Care-Based Standard, 16 Yale J.L. & Feminism
83, 85-86 (2004) (suggesting that the law should recognize a variety of nonmarital and
nonconjugal family relationships).
30 Beckert, note 7, at 110.
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to pay the estate tax? The answer seems to be "very few,"3! but the
stories are nonetheless powerful, because they are not simply invoking
family property but a very specific type of family property. Mr. Bliss,
for example, is asserting his desire to inherit his family's ranch-and
not an equally valuable portfolio of municipal bonds. The family farm
or business seems to have a personal quality that sets it apart from
fungible wealth owned by the family. The ranch is not only a source
of income and economic security: It also typically bears the family
name and, over time, has created for each family member a reputa-
tion, a status in the community, and a sense of belonging. So, the
value offended by the prospect that a family might lose its farm or
business is what we might term the identity value of the family.
The claim, then, might be stated in something like these terms: The
older generation has a right, and perhaps an obligation, to transfer,
and the younger generation has a right, and perhaps an obligation, to
receive, intangible assets like reputation, community standing, and
other identity goods.
Stating this claim begins to point up the many questions it raises.
The clash with testator freedom is obvious: What if Dad wants to sell
the family business? Should the law enable the children to stop him?
And then there are questions about what identity means, and to what
extent the law should privilege identity that is wrapped up in material
inheritance of large, lumpy assets over identity that takes a more fun-
gible or less lucrative form.
For instance, what about the person who would dearly love to con-
tinue the religious missionary work her mother encouraged her to
do-but needs cold, hard cash to support her and provide travel funds?
Should the law exempt her financial inheritance because it arrives in
the service of family-linked personal identity? That would, obviously
enough, probably mandate repeal of the wealth transfer taxes entirely,
since many people genuinely understand even the most generic finan-
cial inheritance to be at least weakly linked to family and personal
identity ("my parents cared enough about me to leave me this
money").
And what about the many people without assets to support their
family-linked identity? Should the state subsidize them? Or is family-
31 Less than 2% of all estates pay any estate tax at aU. And of those estates that do pay
tax, the absolute numbers of those that belong to farmers and small business owners is
fairly small, ranging from a couple thousand per year (under prior law) to a few hundred
per year under current law. Of these, only a minority experience liquidity problems in
paying the tax that they owe. Congo BUdget Office, Effects of the Federal Estate Tax on
Farms and Small Businesses, at vii, 15 tb1.8 (2005), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/
65xxldoc6512/07-06-EstateTax.pdf.
Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U. Tax Law Review
134 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:
linked identity only worth special treatment for those who inherit it
along with valuable assets?
Once again, the conventional family ideal, in the form I have de-
scribed it, is insufficiently rich to draw boundary lines around which
kinds of inheritances have a sufficient link to identity to merit special
treatment. Still, without addressing these thorny definitional issues,
we can see that, as many people have pointed out, there are a number
of legal options for accommodating the identity concern as it appears
in the context of inheritance. Special valuation rules are one option.
Delayed payment is another option. Favorable rates are a third
possibility.
One basic insight, then, is that the family as a source of identity can
co-exist peaceably with inheritance taxation. Whether via special val-
uation rules, delayed payment, or otherwise, the law might privilege
forms of inheritance with an identity element but still exact some in-
heritance tax, at least on inheritances of very large value. It is only if
we add the premise that the state may not tax identity inheritance no
matter how large its money value that we reach the conclusion that
inheritance tax should not be permitted on identity-laden assets.
This additional premise-that the money value of identity-creating
assets should be irrelevant for taxation-is not typically articulated in
the political stories, since all these families seem to live modestly.32
But the question is worth taking seriously, since it is not obvious how,
if at all, identity and monetary value are linked. As a corollary, it is
not obvious that even a very high exemption level would adequately
address the concern that inheritance taxation may compromise fami-
lies' ability to pass on their chosen way of life.
One view would hold that wealth is indeed irrelevant. Even if one's
family name is Hilton, as in Hilton Hotels, or Walton, as in Wal-Mart,
one should be entitled to participate in the sense of intergenerational
continuity that owning a multibillion corporation can bring. An alter-
native view of identity and wealth would require some personal par-
ticipation: Perhaps it should make a difference if the junior Hilton is
working day to day to help build or maintain the company-rather
than jet-setting to parties. Put another way, the strategy of incorpo-
rating a high exemption level is effective only if the protected ways of
life can adequately be defined by their monetary value rather than by
some other quality.
32 See Beach, note 12. Of course, the Beach stories do not portray the families with the
most to gain from estate tax repeal. Cf. Graetz & Shapiro, note 4, at 17-19 (noting that
very wealthy families like the Mars and Gallo families contributed to lobbying organiza-
tions dedicated to estate tax repeal).
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But without attempting to offer a theory of wealth and identity, I
want to end with the final iteration of my basic thesis: While there is
some account of family and identity that could lead one to oppose
inheritance taxation (and even then, perhaps only for certain assets),
there are equally plausible theories that could co-exist with inheri-
tance taxation, particularly with special rules for family enterprises
and so on. Thus, recognizing inheritance as a source of personal iden-
tity does not necessarily undermine inheritance taxation, although it
does suggest that the terms of the tax should perhaps offer special
treatment for certain identity-laden assets.
C. The Functional Family
A third ideal adopts a functional perspective: The family does-and
ought to-serve as one of the social institutions that promote economic
security for its members. Family property and inherited wealth, on
this view, would serve the function of providing assets to be used to
care for family members in times of need. Beckert identifies this
strand of thought in various historical debates over inheritance law
and taxation.33
There are hints of this ideal of the family in some of the anti-death-
tax stories. For instance, Mr. Bliss recounts that the first generation of
ranchers used the family's assets to give a start to the second genera-
tion: Mr. Bliss's grandmother sold their original homestead to help
his parents buy the ranch that he and his children now run.34 The
Bliss story also refers to reinvestment, to financial prudence, and to
modest spending, all of which add to the sense that the family is a unit,
and one that properly conserves its property against hardships like the
tough economic times Mr. Bliss refers to.
It is fascinating to think about what inheritance law and inheritance
taxation might look like if we were to take seriously the ideal of the
family as a source of insurance against financial hardship. Just as in
the conventional family ideal, the law would need to define family, but
this time with an eye to what obligations the law should enforce. To-
day, U.S. law generally obligates parents to support their minor chil-
dren and, with some exceptions, their spouse. But beyond that, adults
have few to no responsibilities for other adults, including unmarried
33 Beckert, note 7, at 41-45 (discussing arguments among French commentators over the
effects of testamentary freedom on families' ability to provide for their members); id. at
129-30 (describing how both sides invoked the rationale of providing for family members
in French debates over entails in 1826); id. at 214-15 (discussing the concern in nineteenth
century Germany that redistribution might interfere with the function of the family as pro-
viding financial support to its members).
34 Bliss Statement, note 13, at 2.
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partners (unless a palimony claim can be sustained), adult children,
aged parents, and so on. De jure, the United States is an individualis-
tic society with few legally cognizable family claims. De facto, of
course, many families provide extensive care to their members over
long periods, and many families understand it to be their duty to do
so.
If the goal were to maximize the family's functionality as a source of
financial insurance, it seems that a number of reforms in inheritance
law and inheritance taxation would be in order. For instance, inheri-
tance law might require (or inheritance tax rules might encourage)
family members to leave their wealth not simply to other family mem-
bers, but to those who are neediest. The law could even explicitly
direct or encourage gifts and bequests based on the disability status of
the recipient or her age or her wealth.
Of course, any such obligation would clash with the value of testa-
tor freedom, but it could also clash with conceptions of family prop-
erty, particularly those that emphasize the equal treatment of family
members. For instance, Beckert describes how Western inheritance
laws gradually evolved to mandate or encourage the equal division of
property among children.35 Today, in the United States, as Lily
Batchelder's article mentions, equal division tends to be the norm.36
Requiring division of assets according to need would mark a signifi-
cant normative shift.
Does the ideal of the family as social insurer militate against inheri-
tance taxation? At first, it may seem so. If families are supposed to
provide economic security to their members, the taxation of family
wealth will necessarily reduce the pool of money available for needy
or distressed family members.
But, once again, there is an elision in the antitax argument. It is not
obvious that the social insurance function of the family mandates the
perpetuation of family wealth, completely untaxed, forever, in the ab-
sence of an identifiable need for the money. Here, I think, Nagel's
intuition about high exemption levels becomes especially salient.37
(Note that Batchelder's proposal would provide an exemption per
heir of $1.9 million, and she suggests that a person inheriting that
amount could live her entire life without working.38) If one function
of inheritance is to permit families to make reasonable financial provi-
sion for care for those in need, then a large exemption per heir should
35 Beckert, note 7, at 110-11.
36 Lily L. Batchelder, What Should Society Expect from Heirs? The Case for a Compre-
hensive Inheritance Tax, 63 Tax L. Rev. 1 (2009).
37 See text accompanying note 3.
38 Batchelder, note 36, at 63.
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answer the concern that inheritance taxation interferes with the fam-
ily's mission.
Put another way, high exemption levels fail to resolve the func-
tional-family objection to inheritance taxation only if the ideal of the
functional family insists that 100% of family wealth should be availa-
ble to meet family members' future needs, even if need is not present
among living heirs.
But even if something like a perpetual fund for family need is the
ideal, then there would be further legal questions. Something like a
perpetual trust might be in order, but the law might mandate benefi-
ciaries, rather than leaving it to testator choice. Further, the law
might impose distribution rules to ensure that the wealth was in fact
used to meet need rather than simply to improve consumption oppor-
tunities, forcing distributions to (say) poor cousins rather than to rich
children, whatever the testator's wishes might have been.
One suspects that a mandatory family welfare fund is not quite what
opponents of the inheritance tax have in mind. Instead, they seem to
want to invoke the ideal of family as social insurer in service of a re-
gime that largely implements a libertarian ideal of unconstrained tes-
tamentary freedom. It is logically possible to combine these values,
but only by returning to a relatively stark libertarian view that has
much to do with a particular conception of the individual and the state
and relatively little to do with the family and the relief of financial
distress. This view would hold simultaneously that (1) the state has no
legitimate role in assuaging financial distress or need suffered by indi-
viduals, (2) taxation by the state therefore cannot be justified by the
state's social insurer function, and yet (3) it should remain entirely up
to the individual property owner to decide for herself how to respond
to the financial distress of family members.
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